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Ensuring Capacity Adequacy in Liberalised Electricity Markets

Nicolas Astier and Xavier Lambin

Year: 2019
Volume: Volume 40
Number: Number 3
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.40.3.nast
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Abstract:
This paper studies wholesale electricity markets where an exogenous price cap is enforced, compromising both short- and long-term incentives. To guarantee capacity adequacy, policy-makers may provide support for generation through a capacity remuneration mechanism (CRM) and/or encourage demand response (DR). Such mechanisms are formalised within a common simple analytical framework, clarifying how these mechanisms relate to each other. We then divide them into two categories, depending on whether their implementation requires transactions to be made based explicitly on spot prices higher than the price cap. While mechanisms that keep implicit these high marginal costs are likely to be preferred from a political perspective, they also appear to be less efficient. If they are to be implemented nonetheless, we suggest that the price cap should be set higher than the marginal cost of the most expensive plant, and highlight that challenges for demand-response integration in CRMs remain.



Cross-border Effects of Capacity Remuneration Schemes in Interconnected Markets: Who is Free-riding?

Xavier Lambin and Thomas-Olivier Léautier

Year: 2019
Volume: Volume 40
Number: Number 6
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.40.6.xlam
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Abstract:
We study the welfare impacts of domestic support schemes for generation capacity when energy markets are interconnected. We find that if transmission system operators (TSOs) can't reduce export capacity and neighbors stay energy-only, a capacity market is ineffective unless transmission capacity is small. If TSOs can reduce export capacity, the capacity market attracts investments and Security of Supply (SoS) of non-domestic markets shrink. A neighboring energy-only or strategic reserve market will thus be prejudiced in the long-run and may have to implement a capacity market as well in order to meet its SoS standard. Hence, capacity markets may spread in Europe thanks to their negative cross-border effect on investment incentives. This is in sharp contrast with the conventional wisdom, based on short-term arguments, that energy-only markets will free-ride the SoS provided by neighboring capacity markets. Our conclusions urge for the harmonization of capacity remuneration schemes across Europe.



On the Viability of Energy Communities

Ibrahim Abada, Andreas Ehrenmann, and Xavier Lambin

Year: 2020
Volume: Volume 41
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.41.1.iaba
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Abstract:
Following the development of decentralized production technologies, energy communities have become a topic of increased interest. While the potential benefits have been described, we use the framework of cooperative game theory to test the ability of such communities to adequately share the gains. Indeed, despite the potential value created by such coalitions, there is no guarantee that they will be viable: a subset of participants may find it profitable to exit the community and create another one of their own. We take the case of a neighborhood, having access to a limited resource - e.g. a shared roof or piece of land - which they can exploit if they invest in some renewable production capacity. By joining the community, participants also enjoy aggregation gains in the form of reduced network fees. We find conditions depending on the structure of renewable installation costs, on the magnitude of the aggregation effect and coordination costs and, most importantly, on the chosen sharing rule, under which the whole energy community is stable. In particular, we show that standard sharing rules often fail to enable communities to form and we suggest the adoption of slightly more sophisticated rules. Efficiency could require the intervention of a local planner or a change in network tariff structures.



The Energy Efficiency Gap in the Rental Housing Market: It Takes Both Sides to Build a Bridge

Xavier Lambin, Joachim Schleich, and Corinne Faure

Year: 2023
Volume: Volume 44
Number: Number 1
DOI: 10.5547/01956574.44.1.xlam
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Abstract:
We revisit the issue of the energy efficiency (EE) gap by explicitly acknowledging the two-sided nature of the rental housing market and two-sided asymmetries of information between tenants and landlords. Employing a theoretical matching model, we show that Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs) that signal a dwelling’s energy performance induce optimal EE investments by landlords only if tenants pay their energy expenditures in full. When landlords pay part of the energy expenditures, they seek tenants who will conserve energy. Our model shows that asymmetry of information over tenant characteristics results in suboptimally low investments in EE. This may even render EPCs counterproductive. As a remedy, we show that tenant-side signaling needs to be rolled out jointly with EPCs and may even be sufficient when contracts include energy expenditures. Data from an original survey provides support for these insights and suggests that information on the tenants’ side contributes to more EE investment.





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