

High Oil Prices: A Non-OPEC Capacity Game

Petter Osmundsen, Bård Misund,
Frank Asche, Klaus Mohn






"I am disappointed about the shortfall of investments on the supply side. Large, international oil companies seem to prefer looking for oil at the NYMEX trading floor, instead of exploring for resources around the world. They have a social responsibility, but prefer to buy back their own shares," Fatih Birol, IAE Chief Economist

Key questions and issues

- Why hasn't non-OPEC supply responded to higher oil prices?
 - Tightened capital discipline (?)
 - Focus on performance indicators (?)
 - Tough demands from financial markets (?)

Oil price and production growth




Source: Deutsche Bank

Sluggish long-term investments

- Exploration spending has fallen
- A more myopic industry?
- A new investment equilibrium?

Exploration spending and oil price



Source: Deutsche Bank

Oil industry dynamics in the 1990s

- Globalisation
 - Politics, economics, technology, communication, financial markets
- Deregulation and liberalisation
 - Privatisation of former NOCs
 - Business principles gained ground in oil and gas
 - The investment universe expanded
- Pressure from financial markets
- Massive restructuring and corporate improvement

Short-term financials at centre stage

Common key performance indicators

Clear and transparent targets

Financial and operational indicators and targets




	2001	2002	2003	2004	2004 target
• RoACE (normalised) ¹	9.4%	10.8%	12.4%	12.3%	12%
• Production (1 000 boepd)	1 007	1 074	1 080	1 093	1 120
• Reserve replacement rate ²	0.68	0.78	0.95	1.01	> 1.0
• Finding & dev. cost ² (USD/boe)	9.1	6.2	5.9	8.47	< 6.0
• Production cost ¹ (USD/boe)	3.00	2.94	2.77	2.96	< 2.7

¹ Normalised, ² 3-year average.



RoACE by company 1997-2002 (average), per cent

RoACE by company
1997-2002 (average), per cent




- Source: UBS Warburg
 - "Integrated Oils Analyser"

Valuation rewards from RoACE (?)

RoACE and EV/DACF 2005

- RoACE – Return on Average Capital Employed
- EV – Enterprise Value
- DACF – Debt-Adjusted Cash Flow



Accounting for financial multiples

$$EV = \frac{FCF}{WACC - g} \Rightarrow \frac{EV}{FCF} = \frac{1}{WACC - g}$$

$$FCF = DACF - I$$

where

$$DACF = EBIT \cdot (1 - t) + DD\&A$$

$$I = LTI + \Delta WC$$

Hence,

$$\frac{EV}{DACF} = \frac{1 - \frac{I}{DACF}}{WACC - g}$$

EV-Enterprise value

FCF-Free cash flow

WACC-Weighted average capital cost

DACF-Debt-adjusted cash flow

EBIT-Earnings before interest and tax

DD&A-Depreciation, depletion and amortisation

LTI-Long-term investments


WC-Working capital

I-Total investments

Return on Average Capital Employed

- $ROACE = \text{Net income} / \text{average capital employed}$
- $ACE = \text{shareholder funds and net interest bearing debt}$
- It is of key interest with respect to the oil companies that ROACE can be increased by reducing capital spending
- And ROACE or EV/DACF are often part of managements incentive schemes

Illustration of ROACE contribution in % over a project's life cycle



A capacity game in the oil industry?

		Company 2	
		Passive	Explore
Company 1	Passive	125, 125	75, 150
	Explore	150, 75	100, 100

Valuation research

Harris, T. And Ohlson (1987) AR. "Accounting disclosures and the Market's Valuation of Oil and Gas Properties"

Berry and Wright (2001). JBFA "Disclosures: An Assessment of the Market's Perception of Firm's effort and ability to Discover Reserves"

Quirin *et al.* (2001). JBFA. "A Fundamental Analysis Approach to Oil and Gas Firm Valuation"

Cormier and Magnan (2002). IAAT. "Performance Reporting by Oil and Gas Firms: Contractual and Value Implications"

Bryant (2003). RAS. "Relative Value-Relevance of the Successful Efforts and Full Cost Accounting Methods in the Oil and Gas Industry"

How well do ROACE explain EV/DACF?

- RoACE is significant, but wrong sign
- This is true in all cases with more variables than the ROACE and the oil price in the regression

The full estimated model

Oil price, KPIs and fixed effects

Variable	Coefficient	t-value
OP	- 0.0994	- 1.10
RoACE	- 20.413	- 2.34
PROD	0.0006	0.56
FDC	- 0.0168	- 0.82
UPC	- 0.802	- 1.84
RRR	0.170	0.36
Fixed effects		
Amerada Hess	13.279	6.09
BP	17.470	5.59
Chevron	16.129	5.26
ENI	14.658	6.98
Exxon	18.152	3.88
Hydro	12.974	7.94
Marathon	14.255	6.88
Occidental	15.886	7.90
PetroCanada	13.117	7.38
RD/Shell	15.687	6.25
Repsol YPF	15.874	7.25
Total	15.687	6.25
R ²	0.98	

Concluding remarks

- Increased capital discipline is a possible explanation for reduced production growth and exploration spending
- Can be thought of as a capacity game of the prisoner dilemma type
- The game is noncooperative, but where the capital discipline can influence the outcome and in a way work as a coordination device

Concluding remarks

- Is it a problem that accounting information has become more relevant in valuation of oil companies?
- May be more important for manager's actions than actual company valuation
- The cooperative solution is nonstable